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In response to the recent increase in corporate takeovers,' boards of
directors are protecting key executives with "golden parachute" employ-
ment contracts (golden parachutes).2 Golden parachutes are special employ-
ment contracts between a corporation and a limited number' of the cor-
I See Steyer, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE, Jan. 24, 1983, at 48, 49 (summary of top 50
mergers and acquisitions of 1982). Merger specialists maintain that 1982 marked a high
point in hostile corporate takeoves. Id.; see Ward Howell International, Inc., Survey of Employ-
ment Contracts and "Golden Parachutes" Among the FORTUNE 1,000, (Sept. 27, 1982)
(available from Ward Howell International, Inc., 99 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10010) (ex-
ecutive recruitment firm's study of golden parachute contracts). Although the number of
mergers is below the record levels of the 1960s, the total number of hostile takeovers and
the size of corporate takeovers have increased. Id. at 9; see Steyer, supra (top 50 corporate
deals of 1982 surpassed $48 billion).
See Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at 1. Ward Howell surveyed the
proxy statements of 665 Fortune 1,000 companies. Id. at 1, 2. According to the survey, golden
parachute clauses are becoming increasingly prevalent in executive employment contracts.
Id. at 6, 9. The survey results reveal that golden parachute clauses appeared in 270/0 of
the executive employment contracts dated 1979 or earlier, 37/o of the 1980 contracts, 47%
of the 1981 contracts, and in 53% of the contracts examined from the first nine months
of 1982. Id. at 6. The Ward Howell study attributes the growth in the popularity of golden
parachute agreements to the recent wave in unsolicited takeovers. Id. at 1, 2, 6, 9; see supra
note 1 (current hostile merger wave); see also McLaughlin, The Myth of the Golden Parachute:
What Every Dealmaker Should Know, 17 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 47,47 (1982) (trend toward
golden parachutes understandable in light of increase in merger activity); Morrison, Com-
pensation: Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982, at 82,82 (as a result of in-
creased merger activity more and more golden parachute clauses are appearing in executive
employment contracts); Klein, Controversial Perk A Golden Parachute Protects Executives,
But Does It Hinder or Foster Takeovers?, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1982, at 56, col. 1 (merger
boom explains increase in golden parachutes); Moore, Golden Parachute Agreements Shelter
Displaced Executives, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 25, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (golden parachute
agreements have prospered in era of hostile takeovers) [hereinafter cited as Golden
Parachutes].
I See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 47 (companies extend golden parachutes to only
a handful of senior executives); Morrison, supra note 2, at 86 (critics contend only key ex-
ecutives receive golden parachute protection); Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 2 (most golden
parachute plans cover one to six executives); Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note
1, at 2 (golden parachute plan at "typical" corporation covers two to five executives); see
also Lewis v. Anderson, No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1982) (Conoco's golden parachute covered
nine senior executives); Plaintiffs Verified Complaint at 2, Zimmerman v. Bell, No. 882-2658
(D. Md.) (Martin Marietta Corporation's golden parachutes covered 28 key executives); BEN-
DIX CORPORATION, NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS, Dec. 14,1982, at 14 (Bendix
golden parachutes covered 22 key employees); BENEFICIAL CORPORATION, NOTICE OF ANNUAL
MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS, April 30, 1982, at 9 (Beneficial offered 250 key officers golden
parachute employment contracts); GULF RESOURCES & CHEMICAL CORPORATION, FORM 10-Q:
QUARTERLY REPORT UNDER SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
June 30, 1982, at 8 (Gulf Resources entered into golden parachute agreements with 21 senior
executives in 1981); PENNZOIL COMPANY, FORM 10-Q: QUARTERLY REPORT UNDER SECTION 13
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poration's senior executives.4 Golden parachutes differ from traditional
employment contracts in that golden parachutes do not operate until trig-
OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Sept. 30,1982 (Pennzoil authorized golden
parachute agreements for 11 of Pennzoil's senior executives).
4 See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 47. Golden parachute employment contracts insure
executives against the risks incident to corporate takeovers. Id. Following a successful cor-
porate takeover, the acquiring corporation normally fires a considerable number of the target
corporation's senior executives. See Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating The Duties Of Target
Management In A Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B. U. L. REV. 403,420 n.121 (1980) (successful cor-
porate takeover normally spells dismissal for senior target corporation management); Perham,
Surge In Executive Job Contracts, Dunn's Bus. Monthly, Oct. 1981, at 86, col. 1 (study reveal-
ed that 52% of target corporation's senior executives are no longer with firm in third year
following major takeover); Hayes, Hayes/Hill Incorporated: Study of Executive Employ-
ment (1981) (study revealed that only 42% of target corporation's senior executives are
still with acquired corporation five years after successful takeover). Golden parachutes in-
sure executives against the risk of abbreviated tenure associated with corporate takeovers
by guaranteeing executives that a change of control will not alter either their particular
position and responsibilities or their respective salaries. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at
47-48 (golden parachutes guarantee target executives specific positions, particular salary
ranges, or lump-sum cash bonuses); Master, Execs' 'Golden Parachutes' Await First Court
Challenges, Legal Times of Wash., Nov. 2, 1981, at 10, col. 1 (golden parachutes generally
guarantee that target executives will continue to receive their salaries following takeover
or will receive lump-sum payoff should change of control result in their dismissal); Ward
Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at 3 (golden parachutes guarantee executives' in-
come, position and responsibilities following change of control).
Corporate proxy materials, distributed to shareholders in advance of a corporation's
annual meeting of stockholders, often contain the specific provisions of golden parachute
employment contracts between the corporation and certain of its senior executives. Ward
Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at 2. For example, Acme-Cleveland Corporation's
notice of annual meeting of shareholdes provides in part:
If the executive is terminated by the Corporation without cause during the
three-year period immediately following any "change in control", and, his base
salary, incentive award, and benefits and service credits under the Corporation's
employee benefit plans will be continued for the remainder of the period, but
in no event for less than 24 months following termination of employment.
ACME-CLEVELAND CORPORATION, NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS, Dec. 23,1982,
at 11. Allied Corporation's proxy material, on the other hand, provides in part:
Allied has adopted changes in employee benefits that would come into effect
for certain senior executive employees in the event such an employee terminated
his employment with Allied within a period of two years following an acquisition
of Allied by another company, as a result of which Allied ceased to be an indepen-
dent, publicly owned corporation. The specified employees would be entitled to
two years' severance pay in an annual amount equal to the employee's highest
year's compensation (consisting of salary and awards under Allied's Incentive Com-
pensation Plan). They would also be entitled to the full vesting of certain life in-
surance and retirement benefits; the continuation in effect during the two-year
severance period of certain other employee benefits; and payments in lieu of awards
under Allied's Incentive Compensation Plan and any unvested account under
Allied's Stock Purchase and Savings Plan.
ALLIED CORPORATION, NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDES, Dec. 14, 1982, at 99-100.
Bendix Corporation also disclosed the terms of the corporation's golden parachute employ-
ment contracts in the corporation's notice of special meeting of stockholders. BENDIX COR-
PORATION, supra note 3, at 14. Bendix's notice to shareholders provides in part:
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gered by a change of control in an executive's corporation.' Once trig-
gered, golden parachutes provide executives with lucrative severance
[B]endix employment agreements ... provide for certain payments following the
termination of employment by Bendix, or by the employee following a diminution
in compensation or position, following a Change in Control ... of Bendix, including,
among other things, a continuation of base salary and incentive compensation
payments (against which will be offset such compensation received from a subse-
quent employer after 18 months following termination of employment with Ben-
dix) for the period ending on the earlier of (i) 4 years from the date of a Change
in Control (6 years in the case of William M. Agee) or (ii) 3 years from the date
of termination of the key employee's employment with Bendix (5 years in the .
case of Mr. Agee).
Id. Finally, Beneficial Corporation's notice of annual meeting of stockholders provides in part:
The employment contracts will be operative for a three-year period if a change
of control occurs. They will provide key employees (a) compensation during the
employment period at a rate equal to that existing immediately prior to the change
in control, adjusted through such period to reflect increases based upon the
Company's prior practices, and (b) continued elegibility during such period under
the Company's employee benefits plans. A key employee's good faith determina-
tion that the nature and scope of his or her duties has been limited following
a change of control would entitle the employee to terminate employment with
the Company. In that event or the event of a termination of employment by the
Company other than for cause, most components of such compensation and benefits
would continue through the remainder of the three-year period.
BENEFICIAL CORPORATION, spra. note 3, at 9.
1 See Ward Howell International Inc., supr, note 1, at 3. A change of control in an
executive's corporation triggers the executive's golden parachute. Id. The exact circumstances
that constitute a change of control sufficient to trigger a golden parachute differ among
agreements. Id.; McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 47. Golden parachute definitions of change
in control include the accumulation of a certain percentage of a corporation's stock by one
party, a change in the directors constituting a majority of the board, the replacement of
a top executive in the corporation, or the delisting of the company's stock from a major
stock exchange. Ward Howell International Inc., supra note 1, at 3; see, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson,
No. 6505, (Del. Ch. Oct. 8,1982) (Conoco golden parachute define change of control as accumu-
lation of 200 or more of Conoco stock by one party or delisting of Conoco stock from New
York Stock Exchange).
Corporations occasionally include a definition of the exact circumstances that constitute
a change of control sufficient to trigger the corporation's golden parachute employment
contracts in the corporation's proxy material. Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note
1, at 2. For example, Acme Cleveland Corporation's annual notice to shareholders provides
in part:
For the purpose of the agreements, a "change in control" will be deemed to take
place if, as a- result of a tender offer or other acquisition of securities of the Cor-
poration, or a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets of the Corporation, or any
combination of these transactions (a "Transaction"), either (a) the persons who
were Directors of the Corporation immediately before the Transaction cease to
constitute a majority of the Board of Directors of the Corporation or (b) the employ-
ment of the person employed as Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation on
the operative date terminates involuntarily (other than for cause). If within five
years of the Transaction (1) such a change in Directors takes place during any
twenty-four month period or (2) the Chief Executive Officer's employment so
terminates, the change or termination will be deemed to result from the Transac-
tion. In addition, the election at anytime of two or more Directors whose election
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packages,' which can include cash settlements in excess of several times
an executive's yearly income.7 Like traditional employment contracts,8 the
scope and provisions of golden parachutes differ among agreements.'
is opposed by a majority of the Board then in office will be deemed, in itself to
be a "change in control."
ACME-CLEVELAND CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 10-11. Bendix Corporation's special notice
to stockholders, on the other hand, provides in part:
The agreements define Change in Control as (i) the acquisition by any person,
directly or indirectly, of securities of Bendix representing 51% or more of the
combined voting power of the then outstanding securities of Bendix or (ii) a change
in the composition of a majority of the Board of Directors of Bendix within twelve
months after any person acquires, directly or indirectly, securities of Bendix
representing 25% of the combined voting power of the then outstanding securities
of Bendix.
BENDIX CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 115; see also Profusek, ExecutiveEmployment Contracts
in the Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REV. 99,105-07 (1983) (examples of golden parachute trig-
ger definitions).
8 See Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col. 1. Golden parachutes normally guarantee
executives that a change of control will not effect their salary or position. Id.; supra note
4 (golden parachutes insure executives against risks incident to corporate takeovers).
Accordingly, a golden parachute employment contract guarantees an executive's salary and
benefits for a specified number of years following a change of control or stipulates a lump-
sum payment to the executive in the event of dismissal or downgrading of the executive's
position or responsibilities following a change of control. Ward Howell International, Inc.,
supra note 1, at 2; see also supra note 4 (compensation guaranteed executives by golden
parachute contracts).
7 See Morrison, supra note 2, at 82 (survey and analysis of golden parachute contracts
with Fortune 1,000 corporations). Fortune scrutinized the proxy statements of 155 companies
that had adopted golden parachute employment contracts. Id. The Fortune survey revealed
15 corporations with golden parachute agreements that, if triggered, would provide a depart-
ing chief executive with a $2.5 million or more severance package. See id. at 85 (Fortune
estimates potential value of American Family Corporation's chief executive officer's (CEO)
golden parachute at $7.8 million, GK Technologies' CEO's golden parachute at $7.3 million,
Conoco's CEO's golden parachute at $4.1 million, Thiokol's CEO's golden parachute at $4.0
million, Allied's CEO's golden parachute at $3.9 million, Pennzoil's CEO's golden parachute
at $3.7 million, American Medical International's CEO's golden parachute at $3.1 million,
Time Inc.'s CEO's golden parachute at $3.0 million. Celanese Corporation's CEO's golden
parachute at $2.5 million).
I See generally G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD. COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE (3rd ed. 1962) (examples of traditional executive employment contracts).
' See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 47. Ranging from the moderate to the extreme,
golden parachute agreements differ among corporations. Herzel, Golden Parachute Contracts:
Analysis, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15,1982, (special section), at 20, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Analysis].
Golden parachute contracts differ in terms of the number of executives covered, the number
of years of coverage, the potential costs, the specific circumstances that constitute a change
of control, and the particular circumstances that entitle an executive to receive benefits
under the agreement after a change of control has occurred. See McLaughlin, supra note
2, at 47-48 (examples of golden parachute contracts); Profusek, supra note 5, at 112-15 (same);
Analysis, supra at 20, col. 1 (same); supra notes 3-5 (same).
For example, a golden parachute can provide an executive with an unconditional cash
bonus following a change of control in the executive's corporation. Analysis, supra, at 20,
col. 1. Ordinarily, a change of control in an executive's corporation triggers the executive's
golden parachute employment contract. See supra note 5. Once triggered, cash bonus golden
parachutes, on the one hand, provide the executives who voluntarily leave the acquired
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Although golden parachutes are increasing in popularity," the propriety
corporation, after determining in good faith that the change of control will prevent them
from effectively discharging their duties, with unconditional cash bonus golden parachute
benefits. Analysis, supra, at 20, col. 1. Conditional golden parachutes, on the other hand,
only provide golden parachute benefits to the executives whom an acquiring corporation
dismisses or subjects to adverse consequences following a change of control. Id.
Conoco Inc.'s golden parachutes with Conoco's CEO is an example of an unconditional
cash bonus golden parachute. Analysis, supra, at 20, col. 1; see also infra note 38 (Burnup
& Sims' CEO received unconditional cash bonus golden parachute). Conoco's board of direc-
tors authorized Conoco's CEO's cash bonus golden parachute following an unsuccessful tender
offer for 20% of the common stock of Conoco by Dome Petroleum, Ltd. Brief of Appellees
at 4, Lewis v. Anderson, No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1982; see Analysis, supra, at 20, col.
1 (corporations generally authorize cash bonus golden parachutes in response to hostile
takeovers); infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (golden parachutes may operate as
defensive measure to hostile takeover). Several days after Conoco's board authorized the
cash bonus golden parachute, Seagram Company, Ltd., Mobil Corporation, and Dupont all
initiated cash tender offers for control of Conoco. Brief of Appelles at 4., Lewis v. Anderson,
No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1982). The cash bonus golden parachute guarantees Conoco's CEO
a lump-sum payment equivalent to the present discounted value of the CEO's monthly salary
and benefits through March 1989. Analysis, supra, at 20, col. 2. The only condition to Con-
oco's CEO's receipt of the lump-sum payment is a change of control in Conoco and a good
faith determination by Conoco's CEO that he cannot continue to work for the new corpora-
tion. I&
In addition to authorizing a cash bonus golden parachute for Conoco's CEO, Conoco's
board authorized conditional golden parachute employment contracts for eight other senior
Conoco executives. Id. The Conditional golden parachutes differ from the cash bonus agree-
ment granted Conoco's CEO in that the conditional golden parachutes allow parachute benefits
only if Conoco undergoes a change of control and the new corporation fires the executive,
downgrades the executive's position, reduces the executive's salary, fails to increase the
executive's salary annually in accordance with an established procedure, fails to maintain
the executive's benefit plans, or requires the executive to relocate. Id. The conditional golden
parachute employment contracts, if triggered, also only provide Conoco executives with
the right to receive monthly payments equal to 1/12 of annual base salary plus 1/12 of the
executive's highest previous annual award under Conoco's incentive compensation plan.
Id. Conoco's board authorized the conditional golden parachutes in response to a corporate
takeover. Corporations, however, generally do not authorize conditional golden parachutes
in response to hostile corporate takeovers, but rather draft conditional golden parachute
provisions into executive employment contracts when the corporation first hires an ex-
ecutive. Id.; See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (golden parachute employment
contracts may allow corporations to hire and retain experienced corporate executives); see
also infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (shareholder derivative suit challenging Con-
oco golden parachute).
According to the Ward Howell study of executive employment contracts with Fortune
1,000 companies, golden parachute contracts generally guarantee an executive's salary and
benefits for five or more years following a change of control or stipulate a lump-sum pay-
ment to executives in the event of dismissal or downgrading of the executive's position
or responsibilities following a change of control. Ward Howell International, Inc., supra
note 1, at 2. The Ward Howell study revealed that the golden parachute agreement at
the "typical" corporation protects two to five executives for more than the five years following
a change of control at a potential cost to the corporation of $1 to $5 million. Id.; see also
Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 1 (most golden parachute plans protect one to six executives
by providing executives with two or three years salary and benefits should executives lose
jobs following change of control).
10 See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 47 (one of every three public companies is considering
golden parachute agreements for senior executives); Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 1 (golden
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of these agreements is still the subject of considerable debate."
To the critics, golden parachute agreements constitute corporate
waste"2 and are tantamount to common-law fraud'3 or theft of corporate
assets." Allegations of corporate waste arise when a corporation gives
something of value to another without receiving fair consideration in
return.'5 Since golden parachute agreements often dictate the payment
parachutes are hottest new executive-suite perk); Ward Howell International, Inc., supra
note 1, at 8 (golden parachutes protected executives involved in six of ten largest mergers
of 1981); see also Morrison, supra note 2, at 82 (as result of increased merger activity more
and more golden parachute clauses are appearing in executive employment contracts);
Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col. 1 (prevalence of golden parachute employment contracts
is increasing in proportion with increase in hostile takeovers); supra note 2 (statistics on
increasing prevalence of golden parachute clauses in executive employment contracts).
11 See generally Cooper, The Spread of Golden Parachutes, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Aug. 1982, at 65; McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 47; Perham, supra note 4, at 86; Profusek,
supra note 5, at 99; Hudson, SEC Is Forming Industry Panel to Suggest Changes in Regulation
of Tender Offers, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1983, at 3, col. 2; Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 2;
Lewin, Business and the Law: Using Golden Parachutes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1982, at -,
col. -; Golden Parachutes, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1; Herzel & Coiling, Controversial 'Golden
Parachutes' Offer Protection, Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 23, 1982, at 10, col. 1; Klainfield,
'Golden Parachutes'For Ousted, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1982, at - col. _; Analysis, supra
note 9, at 20, col. 1; Masters, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1; Ward Howell International, Inc.,
supra note 1, at 1.
" See Lewis v. Anderson, No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1982) (suit brought by dissident
Conoco shareholder alleging Conoco's golden parachutes are improper, illegal, fraudulent,
and waste of corporate assets); Plaintiff's Verified Complaint at 3, Zimmerman v. Bell, No.
B82-2658 (D. Md.) (dissident Martin Marietta shareholders alleged Martin Marietta's golden
parachutes are improper, illegal, wasteful, a gift of corporate assets without business pur-
pose); Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col. 3 (golden parachutes authorized on eve of takeover
that grant unconditional payments to executives can constitute corporate waste); infra notes
15-33 and accompanying text (golden parachutes constitute corporate waste). But see infra
notes 109-33 and accompanying text (carefully drafted golden parachutes do not facilitate
corporate waste).
3 See supra note 12 (actions challenging Conoco's and Martin Marietta's golden
parachutes as fraudulent); Golden Parachutes, supra note 2, at 5, col. 1 (golden parachutes
attacked as common-law fraud on shareholders); infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text
(golden parachutes constitute common-law fraud on shareholders since agreements benefit
executives to detriment of shareholders). But see infra notes 134-46 (properly designed golden
parachutes do not constitute common-law fraud on shareholders).
" See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (critics assert that golden parachutes
may constitute theft of corporate assets); supra note 12 (actions challenging Conoco's and
Martin Marietta's golden parachutes as illegal); see also Golden Parachutes, supra note 2,
at 5, col. 1 (critics view certain golden parachutes as outright theft of corporate assets).
But see infra notes 100-62 and accompanying text (carefully drafted, properly authorized,
and adequately disclosed golden parachutes will survive judicial scrutiny).
15 Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-41 (7th Cir. 1979) (shareholder derivative suit
challenging executive stock ownership plan). Adequate consideration must support executive
compensation arrangements. Id. at 739; See Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234, 240-41
(D.D.C. 1975) (validity of stock option plan depends on whether terms of plan are likely
to facilitate contemplated benefit to corporation); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, -'
160 A.2d 731, 736 (1960) (stock option plan must contain consideration passing to corpora-
tion); Lieberman v. Becker, 38 Del. Ch. 540, -, 155 A.2d 596, 598 (1959) (plan for addi-
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of extravagant cash settlements to executives dismissed following a change
of control in the executives' corporation,"6 critics maintain that corpora-
tions do not receive adequate consideration in return for the payments
extended to executives under the agreements.17 Corporations already com-
tional compensation of executives valid only if consideration passes to corporation at time
plan is put into effect); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, - 90 A.2d 660,
664-65 (1952) (consideration must support granting of stock options); Kerbs v. California
E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, -, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952) (validity of stock option
plan depends upon transfer of consideration to corporation). Corporate expenditures made
pursuant to executive compensation plans must also manifest a reasonable relation between
the value of the benefit conferred by the plan on an executive and the value to the corpora-
tion of the executive's services. Lieberman v. Becker, 38 Del. Ch. 540, ____, 155 A.2d 596,
598 (1959); See infra note 22 and accompanying text (executive compensation must bear
reasonable relation to value of executive's services to corporations).
Executive compensation plans that do not reflect adequate consideration to corpora-
tions or that provide compensation in excess of the reasonable value of an executive's ser-
vices to a corporation facilitate corporate waste. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th
Cir. 1979); Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234, 240-41 (D.D.C. 1975); Michaelson v.
Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979); Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69,
-, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952). Shareholders possess the right to have executive compen-
sation plans that manifest corporate waste declared invalid through shareholder derivative
suits. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (shareholders possess right to challenge
executives' salaries as constituting corporate waste); Heller v. Boylan, - A.D. -, .
29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 672 (1941) (if corporate officers receive excessive compensation then equity
court will order restoration at suit of minority stockholder); Gallin v. National City Bank,
152 Misc. 679, -. , 273 N.Y.S. 87, 117 (1934) (executive compensation expenditures, which
constitute corporate waste, are voidable at option of corporate shareholders).
The retention or acquistion of competent corporate executives constitutes adequate
consideration for executive compensation plans. See Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp.
234, 241 (D.D.C. 1975) (retention of key executives constitutes sufficient consideration for
stock options plan); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (D. Del. 1948) (executive's
promise to remain with corporation for specified number of years constituted adequate
consideration for grant of stock option plan); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, -, 160
A.2d 731, 736 (1960) (adequate consideration for stock option plan includes retaining services
of valued employees or gaining of services of new employee); Lieberman v. Becker, 38 Del.
Ch. 540,_.__, 155 A.2d 596, 598 (1959) (retention of services of valued employee is sufficient
consideration for corporate plan for additional compensation of executives).
16 See supra note 7 (Fortune estimates of lucrative golden parachute severence
agreements).
" See Plaintiff's Verified Complaint at 3, Zimmerman v. Bell, No. B82-2658 (D. Md.)
(shareholder derivative suit challenging Martin Marietta's golden parachute agreements).
The Martin Marietta complaint charges that the golden parachute agreements granted 28
of the corporation's senior executives were unnecessary since all of the senior executives
receive substantial compensation and benefits for all the services the executives render
to Martin Marietta. Id. at 2-3. The complaint further charged that the golden parachutes
were unnecessary since the various key executives were under either employment
agreements or fiduciary duties to remain in the employ of Martin Marietta. Id. But see
infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (proponents assert that golden parachutes enable
corporations to hire or retain key executives); infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text
(proponents maintain that golden parachutes allow target corporation executives to con-
sider takeover proposals objectively); infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (proponents
contend that golden parachutes operate as defensive measure to hostile takeovers).
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pensate senior corporate executives handsomely for services rendered to
the corporation.18 In addition to lucrative salaries, most senior executives
receive elaborate stock ownership plans in return for their services.19
Critics, therefore, maintain that the cash settlements paid executives under
golden parachute contracts are without consideration and hence entail a
waste of corporate assets.0
Critics also contend that golden parachutes waste corporate assets
by overcompensating executives.2 Corporate expenditures made pursuant
to executive compensation arrangments must bear a reasonable relation
to the value of an executive's services to the corporation.' Executive cor-
Is See ALLIED CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 95 (Allied's CEO received in excess of
$700,000 in compensation in 1981); BENDIX CORPORATION, Supra note 3, at 111 (Bendix's CEO
received in excess of $800,000 in salary and bonuses in year ending Sept. 30, 1982); ESMARK.
INC., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS, (Jan. 24, 1983) (Esmark's CEO received
in excess of $800,000 in salary and bonuses in fiscal 1982).
19 See Morrison, supra note 2, at 86 (many companies employ stock option plans to
compensate key executives).
" See supra note 15 (executive compensation plans that provide compensation in excess
of reasonable value of executives' services to corporation facilitate corporate waste). But
see infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text (advocates of golden parachutes contend that
agreements facilitate bona fide corporate objectives and hence do not entail corporate waste);
infra notes 109-33 and accompanying text (carefully drafted golden parachutes do not facilitate
corporate waste).
21 See Morrison, supra note 2, at 86 (critics assert that golden parachutes can over-
compensate inefficient executives}, Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 1 (critics maintain that
golden parachutes are another example of executive "nest feathering").
See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 589-91 (1933) (shareholder derivative suit challenging
reasonableness of executive compensation). Corporate executives possess the right to share
in corporate profits. Id. at 590; see Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 90 (N.D. Ohio
1958) (corporate shareholders do not possess exclusive claim to corporate profits as against
corporate executives whose labor, skill, ability, judgement and effect have made profits
available); Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, __, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 114 (1934) (same).
Executive compensation arrangements, however, cannot facilitate the misuse or waste of
corporate funds. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 590 (1933). Executive compensation, therefore,
must bear a reasonable relation to the value of an executive's services to a corporation.
Id. at 591; see id. at 591-92 (bonus payments unrelated to value of executive's services to
corporation constitute gift or waste of corporate assets); Claimitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co.,
158 F.2d 687, 692 (2d Cir.) (incentive compensation must bear reasonable relation to value
of services compensation is paid to obtain), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 825 (1947); Heublein v.
Wright, 227 F. 667, 677-79 (D. Md. 1915) (executive compensation must be in proportion
to executive's ability, services, time devoted to company, difficulties involved, responsibilities
assumed, success achieved, amounts under jurisdiction, company earnings, increases in volume
or quality of business or both, and all other relevant facts); Ash v. Brunswick Corporation,
405 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D.D.C. 1975) (executive's services and value of stock options granted
must constitute fair exhange); Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915, 919
(E.D.N.Y. 1967) (executive's compensation should relate to executive's ability, time devoted
to corporation, and corporate earnings during executive's tenure); Berkwitz v. Humphrey,
163 F. Supp. 78, 90 (N.D. Ohio 1958) (authorized compensation must reasonably equate to
value of employee's services to company); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 348 (D. Del.
1948) (stock option plan must evidence reasonable relationship between value of employee's
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pensation in excess of the reasonable value of an executive's services con-
stitutes corporate waste.' Since golden parachute agreements normally
provide payments only to executives dismissed following a change of
control,24 critics assert that only the inefficient or incompetent executives
whom an acquiring corporation dismisses following a successful takeover
will receive golden parachute benefits.2 An acquiring corporation in a suc-
cessful takeover, on the other hand, may retain and even promote the
efficient and competent executives from the target corporation.26 Critics,
therefore, conclude that golden parachutes facilitate corporate waste since
the amounts awarded under the agreements may bear no reasonable rela-
tion to the value of an executive's services to the target corporationY
Consideration of the market effect that a corporate takeover has on
services to corporation and value of additional compensation accorded executives by plan);
McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639,653 (D. Md. 1939) (same); Michelson
v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979) (same); Lieberman v. Becker, 38 Del. Ch. 540, -,
155 A.2d 596, 598 (1959) (additional compensation of executives is valid provided reasonable
relationship exists between value of executives services to corporation and value of com-
pensation recieved); Kerbs v. California E. Airlines, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, - 90 A.2d 652,
656 (1952) (same); Mann v. Luke, 277 A.D. 19, -, 68 N.Y.S.2d 313, 318 (1947) (executive
compensation must be in proportion to executive's ability, services, time devoted, difficulties
involved, responsibilities assumed, success achieved, amounts under jurisdiction, company
earnings, increases in volume or quality of business or both, and all other relevant facts);
Heller v. Boylan, - A.D. _, _, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 668 (1941) (executive compensation
must bear reasonable relation to value of executive's services and must not constitute misuse
or waste of corporate funds, or gift to favored few, or scheme to distribute profits under
guise of compensation).
2 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (executive compensation that lacks ade-
quate consideration or bears no reasonable relation to services rendered constitutes cor-
porate waste).
See supra notes 4 & 6 (golden parachutes generally guarantee that target executives
will remain employed by surviving corporation in successful takeover or win recieve lump-
sum payoff should change of control result in executive's dismissal).
I See Morrison, supra note 2, at 86 (inefficient executives whom acquiring corporation
dismisses following change of control will receive golden parachute benefits).
See id. (successful acquiring corporations often retain efficient executives from target
corporation); Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at 8 (many acquiring corpora-
tions in successful corporate takeovers attempt to retain target management and may even
compensate them at higher rate than existing employment contracts stipulate). But see supra
note 4 (successful acquiring corporations in corporate takeovers normally fire considerable
number of senior target corporation executives).
" See supra notes 15 & 22 and accompanying text (corporate waste). Assuming that
acquiring corporations in successful corporate takeovers only fire the inefficient and
incompetent target corporation executives, then golden parachutes may facilitate corporate
waste since golden parachute agreements will provide payments to the incompetent target
executives while the competent target executives will not receive any golden parachute
benefits under the agreements. Id-; see Moore, Congress Takes Dim View of Golden Parachutes,
Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 25, 1982 at 5, col. 2 (during speech to Senate, Senator Slade
Gorton cited golden parachutes as form of executive "incompetence insurance") [hereinafter
cited as Congress]. But see infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (corporations should
offer golden parachute employment contracts only to corporations most valued executives).
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the value of a corporation's stock 8 also supports the criticism that golden
parachutes overcompensate executives.' Corporate takeovers normally
elicit a substantial increase in the market value of a corporation's stock."0
Since most senior executives receive elaborate stock ownership plans from
corporations in return for services rendered,"1 corporate takeovers may
provide executives with substantial returns on their target corporation's
stockholdings. 2 Critics, therefore, maintain that golden parachutes may
overcompensate executives who receive a stock ownership plan as part
of their compensation arrangement with a particular corporation since
the executives' target corporation stockholdings will insure the executives
adequately against the risks attendant to corporate takeovers."
The doctrine of common-law fraud provides another avenue for at-
tacking golden parachute employment contracts.m Corporate directors owe
shareholders a fiduciary duty of honesty, loyalty, and good faith.' The
" See W. GRIMM & T. SIMIC, HANDBOOK OF MERGERS, ACQUISTIONS. AND BUYOUTS, (S. Lee
& R. Colman eds. 1981) (49% premium over market paid on average for target stock during
corporate takeovers in 1979); Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate
Control, J. Bus. 345-76 (1980) (49% premium over previous market price of stock during month
of announcement of tender offer); Chatlos, The SEC vs. Investors on Tender Offers, 56 HARV.
Bus. REV. 6,7 (1978) (target shareholders on average receive 720% premium above market on
shares tendered during hostile tender offer); Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder
Returns: An Empirical Analysis, J. FIN. EcON. 351-73 (Dec. 1977) (target stock experienced
average premium above market of 20.58% during month successful tender offer was
announced).
I See Morrison, supra note 2, at 86 (executives with stock option rights in corpora-
tions may not need golden parachute employment contracts since market price of corpora-
tion's stock may increase during corporate takeover providing executives with added
resources).
" See supra note 28 (market price of corporation's stock increases during corporate
takeovers).
31 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (most senior executives receive stock option
plans as part of executives' compensation arrangements with corporations).
I See Morrison, supra note 2, at 86 (CEO of Reliance Corporation received $3.8 million
for his stock and options in Reliance when Exxon acquired Reliance).
I See id. (almost all top executives have stock in their companies that will appreciate
during takeover and provide executives with added resources). Critics also question why
executives need any takeover protection at all. Analysis, supra note 9, at 23, col. 1. Efficient
and competent executives, according to critics, do not need protection against corporate
takeovers because effective corporate executives always can find new and equally or more
attractive employment. Id.; see Morrison, supra note 2, at 86 (although incompetent corporate
executives stand to benefit from golden parachute employment contracts, critics assert that
inefficient executives do not deserve golden parachutes). But see infra notes 59-69 and
accompanying text (golden parachutes enable corporations to hire or retain executives).
I See Lewis v. Anderson, No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1982) (shareholder derivative suit
challenging Conoco's golden parachutes as fraudulent); Plaintiff's Verified Complaint at 3,
Zimmerman v. Bell, No. B82-2658 (D. Md.) (shareholders derivative suit charging that Martin
Marietta's golden parachutes benefitted executives at expense of corporation and
shareholders); Golden Parachutes, supra note 2, at 5, col. 1 (some attorneys view golden
parachutes as outright common-law fraud on shareholders).
See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939). Corporate directors stand in a
fiduciary relationship with corporate shareholders. Id. at 306; see United States v. Gates,
376 F.2d 65, 77 (10th Cir. 1967) (corporate directors occupy fiduciary relationship to cor-
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fiduciary duty running from directors to shareholders mandates that direc-
tors manage corporations in light of the best interests of corporate
shareholders. 6 A board of directors' authorization of golden parachute
agreements may constitute a breach of directors' fiduciary duty to share-
holders because the agreements ultimately may benefit corporate execu-
tives to the detriment of shareholders. 7 For example, if a twenty percent
change in the ownership of a corporation's stock triggers a golden
parachute, then the remaining target shareholders are left bearing eighty
percent of the costs of the golden parachute agreements in the form of
a reduced return on their investment in the surviving corporation.
poration and corporate shareholders); accord Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d
Cir. 1955); Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 396 (6th Cir. 1954); Lachman v. Bell,
353 F. Supp. 37, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Johnson v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 802,
809 (D.D.C. 1969); Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140,144 (DeL Ch. 1975). Corporate
directors, therefore, must manage corporations in light of the best interests of corporate
shareholders. See Gottlieb v. McKee, 34 Del. Ch. 537, ___, 107 A.2d 240, 243 (1954) (while
technically not trustees, corporate officers and directors stand in fiduciary relationship to
corporation and owe shareholders undivided and unselfish loyalty); Litwin v. Allen, 25
N.Y.S.2d 667, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (corporate officers and directors must exercise extreme
measure of candor, unselfishness, and good faith in dealings with corporation and corporate
shareholders). See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING
§ 127.02-127.10 (1982).
Several state corporation statutes codify the standard of care directors owe corporate
shareholders. See generally W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
§ 5.02 (3d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1982). For example, the New York Business Corporation Act
requires directors to perform their duties in good faith and with the degree of care that
an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. N.Y.
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW S 717 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982-1983). The Pennsylvania cor-
porate statute, on the other hand, sets forth that directors shall stand in a fiduciary rela-
tion to the corporation, and shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good
faith and with the deligence, care and skill that ordinary prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, S 1408 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1982-1983). Other
states have adopted the standard of care required of directors as set forth in the Model
Business Corporation Act (Model Act). MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 35 (1978); accord CAL.
CORP. CODE SS 300 et seq. (West 1977 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (rev. 1974
& 1982 Supp.). Section 35 of the Model Act requires directors to mangage corporations
with such care as an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1978). See generally Arsht, Fiduciary
Responsibilities of Directors, Officers and Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 652 (1979); Veasey,
Directors' Standard of Care Under Section 85 of the Model Business Corporation Act, 4 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 665 (1979).
1 See supra, note 35 (directors must manage corporations in light of shareholder best
interests).
1, See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (golden parachutes benefit corporate
executives at expense of corporate shareholders).
1 See BURNUP & SIMS INC.. FORM 10-Q: QUARTERLY REPORT UNDER SECTION 13 OR 15(d)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Oct. 31,1982 [hereinafter cited as BURNUP & SIMS,
INC.: Form 1O-Q]. Burnup & Sims, Inc., the nation's largest telecommunications service com-
pany, entered into a cash bonus golden parachute employment contract with the corpora-
tion's CEO. Id. at 5; see supra note 9 (comparison of cash bonus and conditional golden
parachutes). Burnup & Sims' proxy statement for the company's August 24, 1982 annual
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Critics further assert that target corporation shareholders may bear
the costs of golden parachutes even when a raiding corporation successfully
acquires one hundred percent of a target's stock through an unsolicited
tender offer to target shareholders.3 9 Critics maintain that a raiding cor-
poration may reduce the price offered to target shareholders for their
shares in an effort to compensate for the added liability presented by the
golden parachute agreements.40 Thus, the target corporation shareholders
may bear the costs of the agreements in the form of a reduced price for
their tendered shares. In addition, golden parachute agreements may af-
fect adversely target shareholders' interests even when the target's board
authorizes the agreements after the announcement of an unsolicited tender
offer. Since golden parachutes may dissuade another corporation from
entering the quest for the target corporation,4 the agreements may
preclude shareholders from obtaining the potential premiums a bidding
contest for the target corporation might bring to the price of target
shares.42
meeting of stockholders described the terms of the CEO's golden parachute. BuRNuP & SIMS
INC., ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS, Aug. 24,1982, at 4 n.3. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, Burnup & Sims' CEO became eligible to receive a lump-sum severance payment equal
to 300% of his base compensation plus various stock option rights should a shareholder
or group of affiliated shareholders acquire 29% or more of Burnup & Sims' common stock.
Id. On September 14, 1982 Summit Systems, Inc. increased its holdings of Burnup & Sims'
common stock to 30.8% of the then outstanding common stock of Burnup & Sims. BURNUP
& SIMS INC.: Form 1O-Q, supra, at 6. Pursuant to the terms of the golden parachute agree-
ment, Burnup & Sims' CEO tendered his resignation and Burnup & Sims paid him $4,022,000
in cash. Id. The net effect of the transaction was to increase Burnup & Sims' general and
administrative expenses for the quarter ending Oct. 31, 1982 by $3.5 million. Id. Plaintiffs
have initiated several lawsuits challenging the CEO's golden parachute as fraudulent. See
Greenfield v. Rilely, No. 6933 (Del. Ch.); Stotland v. Burnup & Sims Inc., No. 6956 (Del.
Ch.); Kames v. Sims, No. 82-6627-CIV-EBD (S.D. Fla.). In addition, Summit Systems, Inc.
has obtained a temporary restraining order preventing Burnup & Sims' CEO from dissipating
his personal assets below $5,275,000 and is litigating the legality of the cash bonus golden
parachute. See Summit Sys., Inc. v. Sims, No. 82-1973-CIV-JE (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 1982) (tem-
porary restraining order); see also Summit Sys., Inc. v. Caporella, No. 82-1973-CIV-JE (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 30, 1982) (memorandum opinion affirming temporary restraining order).
39 See Klein, supra, note 2, at 56, col. 2 (costs of golden parachute employment con-
tracts may accrue to shareholders).
4 See Plaintiffs Verified Complaint at 3, Zimmerman v. Bell, No. B82-2658 (D. Md.).
The complaint filed against Martin Marietta Corporation and its officers and directors alleges
that Martin Marietta's golden parachutes affect the corporation's public shareholders directly
by impacting upon any proposed price an acquiring corporation might offer in a future tender
offer. Id.; see Small, The Business-Judgment Rule: Director's Responsibilities In Acquisitions,
in PLI, TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 23, 29 n.16 (A. Fleischer, M.
Lipton, R. Mundheim & R. Santoni eds., 1981) (procedure acquiring corporations use in
evaluating worth of target corporations includes review of target corporations potential
liabilities).
41 See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (golden parachute employment con-
tracts may represent defensive measure to hostile takeovers). But see infra note 75 (whether
golden parachutes deter corporate takeovers is subject to debate).
" See BENDIX CORPORATION, supra, note 3, at 15. Bendix Corporation's notice of special
meeting of stockholders classifies Bendix Corporation's golden parachute employment con-
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In addition to allegations of common-law fraud,43 critics assert that
golden parachutes may facilitate the outright theft of corporate property
since the agreements may dictate the payment of extravagant cash bonuses
to executives following a change of control in the executives' corporation."
Although conditional golden parachute employment contracts provide
benefits only to target corporation executives who suffer adverse conse-
quences following a change of control, cash bonus golden parachutes pro-
vide target corporation executives with unconditional cash bonuses follow-
ing a change of control.4" Cash bonus golden parachute employment
contracts, hastily authorized by interested directors46 in anticipation of
a potential takeover by outside interests, may constitute a theft of cor-
porate property since the interested directors, in effect, would be ap-
propriating corporate property to themselves without a valid business
justification.47
Finally, critics contend that golden parachutes encourage the separa-
tion of ownership from control in corporations.48 Corporate shareholders
tracts as "anti-takeover" devices within the meaning of Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 15230 (Oct. 13, 1978). Id; see Anti-Takeover Proposals, S.E.C. Release No. 15230 (Oct.
13, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81, 748, at 80,984; infra note 77
(description of SEC release No. 15230: Anti-Takeover Proposals). According to Bendix's
notice to shareholders, the corporation's golden parachutes represent an antitakeover pro-
vision since the agreements may discourage a corporate takeover by increasing the poten-
tial cost of a future acquisition. BENDIX CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 15; see also supra note
28 (shareholders receive premium above market on shares tendered during hostile takeover).
0 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (golden parachutes may constitute
common-law fraud on corporate shareholders since agreements may benefit executives at
expense of corporate shareholders).
" See Golden Parachutes, supra note 2, at 5, col. 1 (some attorneys view golden
parachutes as outright theft of corporate assets).
'" See supra note 9 (comparison of cash bonus and conditional golden parachute employ-
ment contracts).
" See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 793 (2d-Cir. 1979) (interested director is direc-
tor with financial stake in transaction under consideration); see also Falkenberg v. Baldwin,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,086, at 91,911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(disinterested directors lack financial stake in transaction under consideration).
" See infra, notes 94-99 and accompanying text (Gulf Resources Corporation refuses
to honor golden parachute agreements granted 21 executives prior to change in majority
of Gulf Resources' board of directors since interested board originally authorized golden
parachutes). Critics maintain that corporate executives who double as corporate directors
may, in anticipation of an upcoming takeover, straddle themselves with lucrative golden
parachute employment contracts. Since golden parachutes may provide executives with
lucrative severance packages conditioned solely upon a change of control and a determina-
tion by the executive that he can no longer work for the corporation, the agreements may
facilitate the theft of corporate assets. See supra note 9 (cash bonus golden parachutes);
supra note 6 (lucrative severance packages provided executives under golden parachute
employment contracts).
" See Congress, supra note 27, at 5, col. 2 (Congress is critical of golden parachute
employment contracts). Senator Slade Gorton (R. Wash.) stated that golden parachutes repre-
sent a "form of executive incompetence insurance." Id. Although the Senator admitted that
he had no solution to the problem of golden parachute employment contracts, Senator Gor-
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are the beneficial owners of corporate property. 9 Corporate executives,
on the other hand, control and manage corporate property.' Corporate
executives, like corporate directors, owe shareholders a fiduciary duty
of honesty, loyalty, and good faith." The fiduciary duty running from ex-
ecutives to shareholders dictates that executives manage corporate prop-
erty in the best interests of corporate shareholders.2 In addition to the
threat of a shareholder suit for breach of fiduciary duty,' market forces,
including the threat of a corporate takeover, encourage executives to
manage corporations in the best interests of corporate shareholders.'
Critics contend that the threat of a corporate takeover, and the attendant
risk of job loss to target corporation executives, 55 may limit an executive's
incentive to act contrary to shareholders' best interests." Since golden
parachutes insure executives against the risks attendant to corporate
ton suggested that the Senate "should explore the legal relationships between the
shareholder, who is the owner and ultimate risktaker, and the corporate management, which
should work for the owners, to see if a means can be found to make their interests better
coincide." Id. See generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1933) (separation of ownership from control in modern corporation); J. GALBRAITH,
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (3d ed. 1979) (technostructure and separation of ownership from
control in modern corporate enterprises). But see infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text
(golden parachutes may allow target corporation executives to consider shareholders' best
interests in corporate takeovers).
4, See D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW, 371 (1979) (shareholders are indirect owners
of corporation's property).
I See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980) (directors and officers,
not shareholders, manage business affairs of corporation); Harden v. Eastern States Pub.
Serv. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 156, __, 122 A. 705, 706-07 (1923) (control and management of cor-
porate property rests in officers and directors).
5 See supra note 35 (fiduciary duty standard).
52 See id. (fiduciary relationship between corporate officers and shareholders).
I See supra note 15 (shareholders' right to petition courts to have executive compen-
sation plans that constitute corporate waste declared invalid); see also infra notes 80-93
and accompanying text (dissident shareholders of Martin Marietta and Conoco have initiated
suits challenging golden parachutes).
I See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (threat of job loss through corporate
takeover encourages executives to manage corporate property in best interests of corporate
shareholders). In addition to the threat of job loss through corporate takeovers, corpora-
tions may replace inefficient executives with more effective managers. Executive employ-
ment markets, therefore, constitute another market force that tends to encourage executives
to manage corporate property efficiently and in shareholders' best interests.
I See supra note 4 (acquiring corporations usually dismiss considerable number of target
corporation executives following successful takeover).
See Manne, Mergers And The Market For Corporate Control, 7 J. OF POL. ECON, 110,
112-13 (1965). Correlating corporate managerial efficiency with the market price of a cor-
poration's stock, Manne maintains that the threat of corporate takeovers disciplines cor-
porate managers into acting in shareholders' best interests. Id. According to Manne, if cor-
porate executives are inefficient then the corporation's stock will not yield a competitive
return to the corporation's stockholders. Id. Economically rational investors, therefore, will
sell their stock holdings in the corporation in an effort to earn a competitive return with
another investment. Id. The combination of a subcompetitive yield on the corporation's stock
with sales of the corporation's stock by rational investors will tend to reduce the market
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takeovers, 7 critics maintain that the agreements negate a market force
that otherwise may tend to equate shareholder and executive interests. 8
In rebuttal to the criticism leveled against golden parachutes, pro-
ponents assert that the prevalence of the agreements has increased so
much that corporations that refuse to offer golden parachute employment
contracts may experience difficulty hiring and retaining key executives.59
Proponents contend that golden parachutes enable corporations to hire and
retain experienced executives." Executive turnover in the upper echelons
of corporate hierarchy has increased in recent years." To hire new or
retain existing executives, corporations must keep pace with current
trends in executive compensation markets. 62 According to proponents, the
price of the corporation's stock, making the corporation more susceptible to a takeover.
Id. Since corporate takeovers normally entail dismissal for target corporation executives,
Manne maintains that the market for corporate control protects shareholders' interests
by providing shareholders with some assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate
managers. Id.; see infra note 58 (significance of market for corporate control in protecting
shareholder interests).
I7 See supra note 4 (golden parachutes insure executives against risks incident to cor-
porate takeovers).
I See supra note 48 and accompanying text (golden parachutes encourage separation
of ownership from control). Market forces that tend to encourage corporate executives to
manage corporate property in terms of shareholders' best interests take on added significance
in light of the difficulties plaintiffs face in vindicating shareholders' rights through lawsuits
against corporate managers. See Manne, supra note 56, at 113 (market for corporate control
plays significant role in ensuring managerial efficiency). The potential court costs and at-
torney's fees involved in bringing a lawsuit combined with the presumption courts accord
the sound business decisions of corporate directors may reduce the viability of a suit for
breach of fiduciary duty as a means of encouraging executives to manage corporate property
in shareholders' best interests and correspondingly increase the importance the market
for corporate control plays in protecting shareholders' interests. See id. (since business judg-
ment rule precludes judicial inquiry into actions by directors taken in good faith, only market
for corporate control assures shareholders of competitive efficiency of corporate executives);
infra note 107 (business judgment rule).
,1 See Morrison, supra note 2, at 83 (golden parachute employment contracts are so
common that corporation which refuses to offer golden parachutes might lose key executives
to competitors).
See id. (golden parachutes enable companies to hire and retain key executives); Klein,
supra note 2, at 56, col. 1 (golden parachutes may enable corporations that might be takeover
targets to hire and retain senior executives); Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note
1, at 2 (golden parachutes enable companies that may become takeover targets to hire and
retain top executive talent); see also ACME-CLEVELAND CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 10
(Acme-Cleveland entered into golden parachute agreements to retain senior executives and
provide corporation with continuity of management in the event of change of control). BEN-
DIX CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 114 (one objective advanced in support of Bendix golden
parachutes was to assure that senior Bendix officers would remain with Bendix during
pendency of offers for control of Bendix).
6 See Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at 9. Executive turnover from
causes unrelated to mergers has increased dramatically. Id. During the 1960's, corporations
dismissed fewer than 25% of their CEOs. Id. In the last five years, however, corporations
have dismissed or let go 50% of their CEOs. Id.
" See Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960,969-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (since
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increasing prevalence of golden parachute contracts reflects, in part, a
realization by corporations that golden parachute contracts are necessary
for hiring and retaining senior executives.'
Proponents maintain, for example, that golden parachutes enable cor-
porations subject to or the likely target of a corporate takeover to retain
senior level executives." Since a change of control normally entails
dismissal for target corporation executives,' target corporation executives
may anticipate the possibility of dismissal following a change of control."
Anticipating dismissal, target corporation executives may commence a
search for more secure employment upon the announcement of a corporate
takeover. 7 Target corporations, therefore, may need to offer executives
added security to prevent senior executives from leaving the target cor-
poration for other employment during a corporate takeover. 8 Proponents
assert that the added security golden parachutes provide executives en-
courages executives of corporations subject to or the likely target of a
corporate takeover to remain in the employ of the target corporation and
competitors of General Motors were pirating key executives from General Motors manage-
ment team, General Motors had to hold out attractive financial benefits to prevent further
loss of valuable executives). See generally G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHCHILD, supra note 8.
1 See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (golden parachutes enable corporation
subject to, or likely target of, corporate takeover to acquire and retain key executives).
" See Brief of Appellees at 4, Lewis v. Anderson, No. 343, (Del. Sup. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Brief of Appellees]. Following an unsuccessful cash tender offer for 20% of Conoco
common stock by Dome Petroleum Ltd., Conoco Inc. authorized golden parachute employ-
ment contracts for nine of Conoco's senior executives. Id.; see supra note 9 (terms of Conoco's
cash bonus and conditional golden parachutes). Conoco maintains that the purpose behind
the golden parachutes was to provide stability for Conoco and security for the company's
senior executives in the event of future takeover attempts and also to provide an incentive
for the nine senior executives to remain in Conoco's employ. Brief for Appellees, supra,
at 4; see also Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at I (golden parachutes enable
companies that may become takeover targets to hire top executive talent).
I See supra note 4 (acquiring corporations dismiss considerable number of target cor-
poration executives following successful takeover).
" See BURNUP & SIMS INC., supra note 38, at 1. After an outside interest had acquired
approximately 30.8% of Burnup & Sims' common stock, 17 of the company's officers and
subsidiary presidents voluntarily tendered their resignations. Id.; see also supra note 38
(17 company officers and subsidiary presidents tendered their resignations following Burnup
& Sims' CEO's resignation). In an effort to forestall the resignations of the 17 key executives,
Burnup & Sims' board of directors authorized golden parachute employment contracts for
the key executives. BURNUP & SIMS INC., supra note 38, at 1. Burnup & Sims' board maintain-
ed that the golden parachutes were necessary to induce the executives to remain in Bur-
nup & Sims employ. Id.
" See supra note 66; see also Analysis, supra note 9, at 22, col. 4 (without tender offer
protection for key executives, reputedly vulnerable target corporation may experience dif-
ficulty hiring high level employees during tender offers); Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col.
2 (companies ripe for takeover may need to offer senior executives added security to pre-
vent senior executives from looking for new employment).
1 See Profusek, supra note 5, at 99-112 (senior executives of target corporations may




thereby provide the target corporation with stability and continuity of
management. 9
Advocates also assert that golden parachutes allow executives to weigh
objectively merger proposals without fear that a change of control might
jeopardize the executive's income." Corporate takeovers present a poten-
tial conflict of interest between management and shareholders of target
corporations. 71 A successful takeover generally presents target share-
holders with the opportunity to receive a substantial premium above the
market price for shareholders' target corporation stock holdings.72 Target
corporation executives, on the other hand, often can expect dismissal
following a successful takeover. 73 Proponents maintain that the financial
security golden parachutes provide executives diminishes any conflict of
interest between executives and shareholders and insures that target cor-
poration executives will not oppose arbitrarily takeovers that might
reward target corporation shareholders.74
One final argument proponents advance in support of golden
parachutes is that the agreements operate as a defensive measure to a
" See ACME-CLEVELAND CORPORATION, supra, note 4, at 10 (Acme-Cleveland authorized
golden parachute agreements to retain senior executives and provide corporation with con-
tinuity of management in the event of change of control); BENDIX CORPORATION, supra note
3, at 114 (one perceived benefit of Bendix golden parachutes was that senior Bendix of-
ficers would remain with Bendix during pendency of offers for control of Bendix).
"' See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 48 (some attorneys argue that golden parachutes take
panic out of takeovers and give executives more objectivity in evaluating acquisition of-
fers); Morrison, supra note 2, at 82 (golden parachutes provide executives with financial
security necessary for striking best deal for corporate shareholders in takeover negotia-
tions); Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 1 (golden parachutes ensure that executives will weigh
merger or acquisition proposals objectively without fear that change of control might jeopar-
dize executives' income); Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at 1 (golden parachutes
enable executives to consider shareholders' interests objectivity during takeover battles
by obviating executives' concern over personal finances).
"7 See Gelfond & Sebastion, supra note 4, at 403, 419-20 (corporate takeovers present
conflict of interest between management and shareholders).
12 See supra note 28 (corporate takeovers normally elicit premium above market price
for target corporation stock).
"9 See supra note 4 (acquiring corporation normally fires considerable number of target
corporation executives following successful takeover).
7' See Analysis, supra note 9, at 23, col. 2. Herzel maintains that golden parachute
employment contracts may benefit target corporation shareholders by increasing executive
independence in a takeover situation. Id. By insuring executives against the risks of cor-
porate takeovers, golden parachutes, may, arguably eliminate a potential conflict of interest
between executives and corporate shareholders and allow executives to weigh shareholder
interests objectively. Id; see Morrison, supra note 2, at 83 (golden parachute provided Reliance
Electric's CEO with degree of independence that enabled CEO to negotiate favorable merger
terms with Exxon when Exxon acquired Reliance); supra note 4 (golden parachutes insure
executives against risks incident to corporate takeovers); supra notes 70-71 and accompa-
nying text (unfriendly takeover presents conflict of interest between target corporation
executives and shareholders since takeover normally entails premium price for shareholders'
stockholdings and dismissal for target corporation executives).
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hostile takeover." In corporate takeovers, the costs attendant to golden
parachute agreements accrue to surviving corporations. 6 Golden para-
chutes, therefore, may discourage complete corporate takeovers by increas-
ing the costs of a proposed takeover." If, however, an acquiring corpora-
" See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981). Corporate management possesses not only a right but the duty to oppose
corporate takeovers that are detrimental to the corporation or the corporation's shareholders.
Id.; see Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) (management has duty to resist
corporate takeovers that might harm corporation); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc.,
518 F. Supp. 390, 408 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (target corporation management can resist corporate
takeover provided target management concludes, after reasonable deliberations, that cor-
porate takeover is not in best interests of target corporation); Northwest Indus., Inc. v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (corporate managements' respon-
sibility is to oppose corporate takeovers that in managements' best judgment are detrimen-
tal to corporation or corporate shareholders); see also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638
F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980) (directors' decision to oppose corporate takeover involves exer-
cise of directors' business judgment). Employment contracts that provide executives with
accelerated benefits in the event of a change of control in the executive's corporation con-
stitutes a defensive measure to a corporate takeover. See Anti-Takeover Proposals, S.E.C.
Release No. 15230 (Oct. 13, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,748,
at 80,984 (executive employment contracts that provide executives with accelerated benefits
upon change of control in executive's corporation constitutes antitakeover device); Wachtell,
Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW 1433, __ (1977) (same); BENDIX COR-
PORATION, supra note 3, at 15 (Bendix Corporation's notice of special meeting of stockholders
classified Bendix Corporation's golden parachute employment contracts as antitakeover
devices); infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (golden parachutes discourage corporate
takeovers by raising acquiring corporation's costs); see also E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219-76 (1973) (defensive measures to hostile
takeovers); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENT IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 193-206 (1977) (same); Cary, Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Manage-
ment from Attack, 25 Bus. LAW 339-50 (July 1970) (same); Panel, Defending Target Companies,
32 Bus. LAW 1349-64 (May, 1977) (same).
Whether golden parachute employment contracts actually deter corporate takeovers
remains the subject of considerable debate. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 86 (plethora of
golden parachutes may deter proposed takeover by making takeover more expensive for
acquiring corporation); Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 2 (some companies advance golden
parachutes as antitakeover measures); Masters, supra note 4, at 10, coL 3 (golden parachutes
may discourage some corporate takeovers since certain golden parachutes provide valuable
target corporation executives with incentive to leave acquired corporation and acquiring
firm may not desire target corporation without target corporation's senior executives); Ward
Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at 2 (golden parachutes may discourage takeovers
by increasing costs of takeover to acquiring corporation). But see McLaughlin, supra note
2, at 48 (since golden parachutes do not increase appreciably costs of corporate takeovers,
golden parachutes do not deter corporate takeovers); Profusek, supra note 5, at 101 (golden
parachutes do not deter corporate takeovers since costs involved in acquiring control of
public corporation vastly exceed costs of golden parachute agreements); Herzel & Collins,
supra note 11, at 10, col. 1 (dollar amounts involved with golden parachute employment
contracts are not large enough to deter corporate takeovers); Analysis, supra note 9, at
22, col. 2 (same).
76 See Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 1 (golden parachutes settlements are payable
by acquired corporation); see also supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (acquired cor-
poration and or target corporation shareholders bear costs of golden parachutes depending
upon terms of change of control).
" See Anti-Takeover Proposals, S.E.C. Release No. 15230 (Oct. 13, 1978) [1978 Transfer
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tion proposes to accomplish a corporate takeover by acquiring the minimum
amount of target corporation stock necessary to effectuate a change of
control, then the remaining target shareholders will bear part of the costs
of the agreements. 78 Even though an acquiring corporation will not bear
the total cost of golden parachute agreements in the latter case, golden
parachute employment contracts still may tend to discourage takeover
attempts since the agreements, if triggered, tend to infringe on the pro-
fitability of the surviving corporation and hence the desirability of a pro-
posed takeover. 9
Although no court as yet has ruled on the merits of golden parachute
employment contracts," plaintiffs have challenged the propriety of these
agreements. 1 A dissident shareholder of Conoco brought suit in Delaware
Chancery Court challenging the legality of golden parachute agreements
between Conoco and nine of its senior executives.
2 Conoco's board8
Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 81,748, at 80,984. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
classifies costly employment contracts designed to make the dismissal of corporate executives
following a change of control expensive to an acquiring corporation as "anti-takeover" pro-
visions. Id. at 80,985 n.3. Pursuant to Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15230 (Oct. 13,
1978), Bendix Corporation's proxy material classified Bendix's golden parachutes as "an-
titakeover" provisions since the agreements may, by increasing the potential costs of an
acquisition, tend to discourage corporations from attempting to acquire Bendix. BENDIX CO-
PORATION, supmc note 3, at 15; see supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (by increasing costs
of corporate takeover, golden parachutes may discourage other corporations from entering
quest for target corporation and hence preclude shareholders from obtaining premium on
target stockholdings that bidding contest might bring).
" See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (costs of golden parachutes accrue
to target corporation shareholders under certain circumstances).
' See Small, supm note 40, at 29 n.16 (procedure acquiring corporations use in evaluating
worth of target corporation includes review of potential liabilities of target corporation);
supra note 38 (triggering of Burnup & Sims' CEO's cash bonus golden parachute increased
Burnup & Sims' quarterly administrative expenses by $3.5 million). Proponents also assert
that golden parachute employment contracts may encourage senior corporate executives
to leave target corporations since cash bonus golden parachute benefits will enable executives
to double their income by leaving the target corporation for other employment. Masters,
supra note 4, at 10, col. 3. By providing senior corporate executives with an incentive to
leave target corporations following a change of control, cash bonus golden parachutes may
operate as a defensive measure to corporate takeovers because the acquiring corporation
may consider the target corporation's management team a valuable asset of the target cor-
poration and refuse to proceed with the takeover without reasonable assurances that the
target corporation's management team will stay on. See id. (an acquiring corporation "could
well invest a great deal in a company and have the whole baseball team gone").
' See Morrison, supra note 2, at 84 (to date, no court has ruled on validity of golden
parachute employment contracts); Profusek, supra note 5, at 102 (no published judicial deci-
sions address validity of golden parachute employment contracts).
I See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text (Conoco, Martin Marietta, Gulf Resources
are litigating validity of golden parachute employment contracts).
I See Lewis v. Anderson, No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1982) (dissident shareholder's suit
challenging Conoco's golden parachute agreements); supra note 9 (Conoco's golden parachute
agreements).
' See Brief of Appellees at 4, Lewis v. Anderson, No. 343 (Del. Sup. Ct. filed Jan.
19,1983) (Conoco's compensation committee, consisting entirely of outside directors, recom-
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authorized the golden parachutes after an unsuccessful tender offer by
Dome Petroleum Ltd.' Following authorization of the agreements,
Seagram Company, Mobil Corporation, and DuPont de Nemours and Com-
pany commenced a bidding contest for control of Conoco." DuPont even-
tually prevailed and merged Conoco into DuPont Holdings, Inc.' The dissi-
dent shareholder's complaint charges that the golden parachute agree-
ments were improper and illegal, a fraud upon the corporation" and a
waste of corporate assets without a bona fide business purpose.' The
Delaware Chancery Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on
the ground that the plaintiff lost his standing to sue since DuPont had
succeeded in taking over Conoco in its entirety.' The case is pending before
the Supreme Court of Delaware on the standing issue."
In a similar proceeding, dissident shareholders of Martin Marietta Cor-
poration have brought suit in Maryland district court challenging the pro-
priety of golden parachute agreements between Martin Marietta and
twenty-eight of the corporation's senior executives." The complaint charges
that the golden parachute agreements were improper and illegal, a gift
of corporate assets without a valid business purpose. 2 The complaint fur-
ther charges that the golden parachutes adversely affect shareholder in-
terests by reducing the value shareholders might receive for their shares
in a future tender offer.
93
mended golden parachute contracts to Board and disinterested directors of Conoco's full




' See Lewis v. Anderson, No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1982); supra notes 34-42 and accom-
panying text (golden parachutes may constitute common-law fraud on corporate shareholders).
' See Lewis v. Anderson, No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8,1982); supra notes 15-33 and accom-
panying text (golden parachutes may facilitate corporate waste).
'9 See Lewis v. Anderson, No. 6505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1982) (Delaware Chancery Court
granted defendants' motion to dismiss since dissident Conoco shareholder lacked standing
to contest golden parachute agreements). In the shareholder derivative suit challenging
Conoco's golden parachutes, the Delaware Chancery Court granted defendant's motion for
dismissal because the plaintiff had failed to lodge an objection to the golden parachute
agreements with Conoco's board of directors prior to the merger. Id.; see Golden Parachutes,
supra note 2, at 5, col. 3 (in Delaware after Lewis v. Anderson, dissident shareholders may
lose standing to contest golden parachute employment contracts by not protesting golden
parachutes prior to consumation of merger).
Lewis v. Anderson, No. 343 (Del. filed Jan. 19, 1983).
" See Plaintiff's Verified Complaint at 2, Zimmerman v. Bell, No. B82-2658 (D. Md.)
(dissident shareholders' complaint contesting propriety of Martin Marietta's golden parachute
agreements).
I Id.; see supra notes 15-33 and accompanying text (critics contend that golden
parachutes facilitate corporate waste).
" See Plaintiff's Verified Complaint at 2, Zimmerman v. Bell, No. B82-2658 (D. Md.);
supra notes 3942 and accompanying text (golden parachutes may affect adversely target
shareholder interests by reducing price offered for target shareholders' stock holdings in
future tender offers).
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In another pending case, Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation
is litigating the propriety of golden parachute agreements. 4 In 1981, Gulf
Resources entered into golden parachute employment contracts with
twenty-one of the company's senior executives. 5 Following a proxy con-
test which resulted in a change in the majority of the board of directors
in 1982,96 Gulf Resources' new board of directors refused to honor the
golden parachute agreements because the chairman of the committee that
previously ratified the golden parachutes also was the recipient of a
lucrative golden parachute employment contract. 7 Shortly thereafter,
eighteen of the twenty-one executives covered under the golden parachute
agreements instituted a declaratory judgment proceeding against Gulf
Resources seeking a court order that the golden parachute agreements
are valid and enforceable contracts. 8 Gulf Resources, however, contends
that the conflict of interest present on the board that ratified the golden
parachute agreements invalidates the board's authorization and hence
relieves Gulf Resources of any obligations with respect to the agreements."
In light of the arguments advanced for and against the propriety of
golden parachute employment contracts, M the legality of a particular
agreement will turn on the purposes behind the agreement, 10' the specific
provisions contained in the agreement,"' and the manner in which the
corporation adopts the agreement.'' Only golden parachute agreements
" See Allen v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp. (D. Tx.); see also Colonial Sec. Corp. v.
Allen (Del. Ch.) (lawsuit challenging Gulf Resources golden parachutes).
11 See GULF RESOURCES & CHEMICAL CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 8.
9Id.
See Klein, supra note 2, at 56, col. 3 (Gulf Resources' executives initiated declaratory
judgment proceeding after dissident director waged successful proxy fight for control of
Gulf Resources).
'9 See id. (Gulf Resources refuses to honor its golden parachute agreements because
board that originally authorized agreements did not possess necessary independence and
disinterestedness).
'9Id.; see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (golden parachutes authorized by
interested directors may constitute theft of corporate assets); infra notes 147-50 and ac-
companying text (only disinterested directors should authorize golden parachute employ-
ment contracts).
" See supra notes 12-79 and accompanying text (arguments advanced for and against
use of golden parachute employment contracts).
"I See Profusek, supra note 5, at 100 (directors must articulate clearly purposes behind
golden parachute employment contracts if agreements are to fall within business judgment
of corporation's directors); see also supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (golden parachutes
enables corporations to hire and retain senior executives); supra notes 70-74 and accompa-
nying text (golden parachutes allow executives to weigh merger proposals objectively without
fear that change of control might jeopardize executives' income); supra notes 75-79 (golden
parachutes operate as defensive measure to hostile corporation takeovers).
" See Golden Parachutes, supra note 2, at 5, col. 1 (specific provisions of golden parachute
employment contracts can affect outcome of judicial challenge); see also supra note 9 (specific
provisions of golden parachute employment contracts differ among agreements).
'0 See Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col. 4 (legality of golden parachute may turn on
manner in which board originally authorized agreement); see also supra notes 43-47 and
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that advance bona fide corporate objectives will survive judicial scrutiny.'
The fiduciary duty running from directors to shareholders prohibits direc-
tors from authorizing corporate expenditures that do not advance
legitimate corporate objectives."5 Maintaining an experienced senior
management team, however, is a principal concern of all corporations."6
In fact, courts have held that reasonable corporate expenditures devoted
to the retention or acquisition of competent corporate executives are valid
and within a board of directors' power to authorize.117 Golden parachutes
designed to acquire prospective or retain existing senior executives,
therefore, manifest a bona fide corporate objective."°8
accompanying text (cash bonus golden parachutes authorized by interested directors in an-
ticipation of change of control constitutes theft of corporate assets).
" See notes 49-52 and accompanying text (fiduciary duty directors owe shareholders
requires that directors manage corporate property in best interests of corporation and
shareholders).
"I See supra note 35 (corporate directors owe shareholders a fiduciary duty of honesty,
loyalty, and good faith).
17 See D. VAGTS, supra note 49, at 332 (corporate goals and executive compensation
arrangements).
107 See supra note 15 (corporate directors possess power to authorize reasonable cor-
porate expenditures for retention or acquisition of competent corporate executives). Cor-
porate directors possess the right to fix compensation of executive officers for services
rendered to the corporation. See Cohen v. Ayers, 449 F. Supp. 298, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (cor-
porate directors possess power over matters of executive compensation), affd, 596 F.2d
733 (7th Cir. 1979); Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173, 188 (D. Del. 1937)
(directors have power to award just compensation to executives); Gallin v. National City
Bank, 152 Misc. 678, __, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (corporate directors acting
as body in good faith possess right to fix compensation of corporate executives for services
rendered to corporation). Absent a showing of fraud, oppression, or bad faith, courts will
defer to the sound business judgment of directors on matters of executive compensation.
Heller v. Boylan, _ A.D.2d ., , 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 671 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Gallin v. National
City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, __, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 117 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
The conclusive presumption courts accord the business decisions of corporate direc-
tors is better known as the business judgment rule. See generally 3A W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §§ 1039, 1040 (M. Wolf ed. 1975 rev.); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, 75-81 (1972); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS S 242 (2d ed. 1970);
Note, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595,1604 (1978). The business judgment
rule precludes judicial inquiry into actions of directors taken in good faith and in honest
pursuit of bona fide corporate objectives. United States Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1980);
Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) affd 672 F.2d 1025 (1982); see
also Heller v. Boylan, __ A.D.2d ., , 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 672 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (shareholders
challenging executive compensation plans must show oppression, fraud, abuse, bad faith,
or other breach of trust on part of corporate directors that authorized plan); Gallin v. National
City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, -, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 117 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (shareholders alleging
excessive executive compensation must bring case within exceptions predicated on breach
of legal duty by directors with consequent damage to corporation).
108 See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (golden parachutes enable corpora-
tions to advance corporate objective of hiring and retaining experienced corporate executives).
In addition to enabling corporations to hire or retain senior executives, proponents assert
that golden parachutes allow executives to consider merger proposals objectively without
concern over personal finances and operate as a defensive measure to hostile takeovers.
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Golden parachutes designed to acquire prospective or retain existing
senior executives, however, will not survive judicial scrutiny unless cor-
porations carefully draft the agreements."9 Golden parachute agreements
differ in terms of the number of executives covered,110 the amount of
benefits guaranteed," and the particular set of circumstances that entitle
an executive to receive benefits under the agreement after a change of
Supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text. Corporate directors possess the duty to institute
measures to deter corporate takeovers that are not in shareholders' best interests. Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,288 (7th Cir.), (cert. denied, 454 US. 1092 (1981); Crouse-
Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 390, 408 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); supra note 75. Before
directors may authorize defensive measures to a hostile takeover, however, directors must
determine, after reasonable deliberations, that a proposed takeover is not in either the
corporation's or shareholders' best interests. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,
381 (2d Cir. 1980); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13
(NJD. Ill. 1969); supra note 75. Assuming golden parachutes do represent a defensive measure
to a hostile corporate takeover, corporate boards of directors must conclude that a cor-
porate takeover is not in the corporation's or shareholders' best interests before a board
may authorize defensive golden parachute employment contracts. Supra. note 75. Boards
of directors, consequently, cannot authorize defensive golden parachutes designed to deter
corporate takeovers prior to the announcement of a corporate takeover since the law
predicates directors' right to take defensive measures to corporate takeovers on directors'
good faith conclusion that a takeover is not in the corporation's or shareholders' best in-
terests. Id.; see supra note 9 (directors authorize cash bonus golden parachutes in response
to hostile corporate takeovers). Provided golden parachutes actually operate as a defensive
measure to hostile corporate takeovers, then golden parachutes reasonably designed to
deter hostile corporate takeovers not in the corporation's or shareholders' best interests
manifest a bona fide corporate objective. But see supra note 75 (whether golden parachutes
operate as deterent to hostile takeovers remains subject of considerable debate).
Golden parachute employments contracts designed to ensure management objectivity
during corporate takeovers, on the other hand, do not advance a legitimate corporate ob-
jective. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 83 (golden parachutes designed to increase manage-
ment objectivity during takeovers provide senior executives with gifts for acting in a fashion
that executives' fiduciary duty already requires). The fiduciary duty corporate officers owe
shareholders requires officers to manage corporate property in shareholders' best interests.
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. Golden parachutes designed to ensure manage-
ment objectivity during corporate takeovers, therefore, do not manifest a legitimate cor-
porate objective because the fiduciary duty that corporate officers owe shareholders already
necessitates management's objectivity during corporate takeovers. Compare supra notes
48-58 and accompanying text (golden parachutes may provide senior executives with so
much security of tenure as to cause separation of ownership from control) with supra notes
70-74 and accompanying text (golden parachutes allow executives to weigh objectively merger
proposals).
I9 See Golden Parachutes, upra note 2, at 5, col. 1 (recommended provisions for carefully
drafted golden parachute employment contract); infra notes 110-33 and accompanying text
(only carefully drafted golden parachutes will survive judicial scrutiny).
"I See supra notes 3, 4, & 9 (number of executives offered golden parachute employ-
ment contracts differs among corporations).
See supra note 9 (number of years of protection and amount of benefits golden
parachute employment contracts provide executives differs among agreements); supra note
7 (Fortune estimates of potential costs of several golden parachute employment contracts);
see also Profusek, supra note 5,112-16 (examples of golden parachute employment contracts);
supra note 4 (same).
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control has occurred." Therefore, to avoid allegations of corporate waste,
corporations must exercise care in drafting golden parachute employment
contracts."'
A carefully drafted golden parachute agreement should ensure that
a corporation receives adequate consideration in return for the grant of
golden parachute employment contracts."' Plans for additional compen-
sation of corporate executives must reflect adequate consideration to
corporations." 5 Executive compensation arrangements that fail to reflect
adequate consideration to corporations facilitate corporate waste."' Courts,
however, have held that the retention of existing executives, or the ac-
quisition of prospective executives, represents adequate consideration to
justify plans for additional compensation of corporate executives."7 Con-
sequently, to avoid allegations of corporate waste, carefully drafted golden
parachutes must guarantee a corporation an experienced senior manage-
ment team by providing for the retention of existing, or the acquisition
of prospective, senior executives."'
Corporations, therefore, should not provide executives with cash bonus
golden parachutes since the agreements may not guarantee corporations
the continued services of corporate executives."9 Cash bonus golden
parachutes provide target corporation executives with unconditional
benefits following a change of control."10 Conditional golden parachutes,
on the other hand, provide benefits only to target corporation executives
who suffer adverse consequences following a change of control."' By
limiting golden parachute benefits to executives who suffer adverse con-
" See supra note 9 (golden parachute agreements differ in terms of exact circumstances
that entitle executive to receive benefits after change of control has occurred).
"I See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (golden parachutes may facilitate cor-
porate waste since amounts awarded executives under agreements may lack considera-
tion); supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (golden parachutes may facilitate corporate
waste since amounts awarded executives under the agreements may bear no reasonable
relation to value of executive's services to target corporation); supra notes 28-33 and ac-
companying text (golden parachutes may facilitate corporate waste since the agreements
may overcompensate executives).
"' See supra note 15 (adequate consideration must support executive compensation
arrangements).
111 Id.
116 See id. (executive compensation plans that fail to reflect adequate consideration to
corporations facilitate corporate waste).
"I' See id. (retention or acquisition of competent corporate executives constitutes ade-
quate consideration for executive compensation plans).
Its Id.
11 See Masters, supra note 4, at 2, col. 3 (corporate counsel are concluding that golden
parachute employment contracts are legal provided contracts do not grant departing ex-
ecutives unconditional cash bonus golden parachute benefits).
1w See supra note 9 (Conoco's CEO's cash bonus golden parachute employment con-
tract); supra note 38 (Burnup & Sims' CEO's cash bonus golden parachute employment
contract).




sequences following corporate takeovers, conditional golden parachute
plans reflect adequate consideration to corporations since the plans pro-
vide for the retention of senior executives.' Cash bonus golden parachutes,
in contrast, may not reflect adequate consideration to corporations since
the agreements may not guarantee corporations the continued services
of corporate executives."= On the contrary, cash bonus golden parachutes,
which provide executives with unconditional benefits following a change
of control, may provide executives with an incentive to leave target cor-
porations following corporate takeovers. An executive under an uncondi-
tional cash bonus golden parachute, in effect, can double his income by
leaving the target corporation with golden parachute benefits and acquir-
ing new employment with another corporation.1" Carefully drafted golden
parachutes designed to advance the corporate objective of maintaining
an experienced senior executive team, therefore, should not provide ex-
ecutives with unconditional cash bonuses. 5
A carefully drafted golden parachute agreement also should not pro-
vide executives with severance packages more generous than executives
could have expected to receive in salary and benefits absent a change
of control.' Boards of directors establish the amount of compensation paid
1 See supra note 15 (retention or acquisition of competent corporate executives con-
stitutes adequate consideration for executive compensation plans).
2 See Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col. 3 (cash bonus golden parachutes may not
guarantee corporations the continued services of key executives).
124 Id. By providing for the offset of direct remuneration received from new employ-
ment against amounts due under an executive's golden parachute contract, corporations
can eliminate an executive's incentive to leave the target corporation following a change
of control by eliminating an executive's opportunity to double his income by leaving the
acquired target corporation with golden parachute benefits and acquiring new employment
elsewhere. See Golden Parachutes, supra note 2, at 5, col. 1 (carefully drafted golden parachute
employment contract should contain offset provision reducing parachute benefits by amount
of earnings executives may garner at new job); see also Profusek, supra note 5, at 109 (most
golden parachutes contain mitigation of damage and offset provisions); supra note 4 (Bendix's
golden parachutes contain offset provisions).
I See Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col. 3 (cash bonus golden parachutes that provide
unconditional benefits to executives may constitute corporate waste); supra notes 119-25
and accompanying text (same). Instead of providing unconditional cash bonus benefits, care-
fully drafted golden parachutes should provide executives with conditional benefits. See
supra note 9 (comparison of Conoco's conditional and cash bonus golden parachutes). Accord-
ingly, a carefully drafted golden parachute designed to maintain a senior management team
should provide executives with benefits only under circumstances in which the acquiring
corporation, following a change of control, dismisses of reduces the responsibilities or in-
come of the target corporation executive. See supra note 9 (Conoco's conditional golden
parachute employment contracts limit benefits to executives who suffer adverse consequences
at hands of acquiring corporation following change of control).
I See Golden Parachutes, supra note 2, at 5, col. 1 (carefully drafted golden parachute
employment contract should contain compensation and benefits clause providing departing
executives with amount of compensation executive could expect to receive during duration
of employment contract absent change of control); Profusek, supra note 5, at 103 & 108-09
(most golden parachutes should withstand judicial scrutiny if contracts do not materially
alter compensation and benefits that executives reasonably could expect to receive during
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executives in terms of the reasonable value of the executive's services
to the corporation."' Executive compensation expenditures in excess of
the reasonable value of an executive's services to a corporation constitute
corporate waste."8 Golden parachute agreements that provide executives
with severance packages more generous than executives could have ex-
pected to receive in salary and benefits absent a change of control,
therefore, may facilitate corporate waste. 9 Consequently, corporations
should limit the benefits paid to departing executives under golden
parachute employment contracts to that amount which the executive could
have expected to receive in salary and benefits absent a change of con-
trol for the duration of the employment contract.'
Finally, a carefully drafted golden parachute agreement should cover
only the senior executives who, in the sound business judgment of a cor-
poration's board of directors, represent the corporation's most valued
executives."' Corporate expenditures made pursuant to golden parachute
agreements that cover more than the corporation's most valued executives
may facilitate corporate waste since the agreements may benefit only the
less competent target corporation executives whom an acquiring corpora-
tion fires following a change of control." Offering golden parachute employ-
ment contracts only to a corporation's most valued executives and gear-
ing golden parachute benefits to executives' salary and bonuses ensures
duration of employment contract period absent change of control). Golden parachute employ-
ment contracts which provide executives with lump-sum severance payments will survive
judicial scrutiny if the lump-sum payment represents the present discounted value of the
executive's salary and benefits for the duration of the golden parachute employment con-
tract. Id.; see also Analysis, supra note 9, at 22, col. 2 (right to receive lump-sum benefits
can be important strategically to executives since lump-sum payment eliminates concern
over disputes with acquiring corporation following corporate takeovers).
"I See supra note 107 (boards of directors establish executive compensation); supra
note 22 (executive compensation must bear reasonable relation to value of executive's ser-
vices to corporation).
'" See supra notes 15 & 22 (executive compensation expenditures that bear no reasonable
relation to value of executive's services to corporation constitute corporate waste).
'z See Profusek, supra note 5, at 103, 108-09 (to avoid allegations of corporate waste,
golden parachute employment contracts should provide executives with salary and benefits
executives reasonably could expect to receive during duration of contract employment period
absent change of control).
I" See Golden Parachutes, supra note 2, at 5, col. 1; Profusek, supra note 5, at 103,
108-09; supra notes 15 & 22 (executive compensation and corporate waste); supra note 126
(most golden parachutes should withstand judicial scrutiny if contracts do not materially
alter compensation and benefits that executive could expect to receive absent change of
control).
"' See supra note 3 (only select few of corporation's key executives receive golden
parachute employment contracts); infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (if corporation
only offers golden parachute employment contracts to corporation's most valued executives,
corporation will avoid allegations of corporate waste).
'1 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (golden parachutes may facilitate cor-
porate waste since amounts awarded under agreements may bear no reasonable relation
to value of executive's services to corporation).
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that the amount of compensation paid executives pursuant to the
agreements bears a reasonable relation to the value of the executives'
services and enables corporations to avoid allegations of corporate waste.",
Golden parachute employment contracts carefully drafted to advance
the corporate objective of maintaining a senior management team do not
constitute a common-law fraud on corporate shareholders since the
agreements represent an essential element of an efficient executive com-
pensation plan.'u In theory, an efficient executive compensation plan will
accord the minimum amount of compensation necessary to hire and retain
experienced corporate executives." The amount of risk associated with
an executive position in a particular corporation is one of the variables
that determines the minimum or equilibrium rate of compensation.1 3 One
of the principal risks associated with an executive position in a particular
corporation is the threat of abbreviated tenure.3 7 In theory, therefore,
an executive's equilibrium rate of compensation should increase, ceteris
paribus, in direct relation with increases in the risk of the executive's
dismissal. Assuming senior corporate executives are risk averse and that
corporate takeovers increase an executive's expectation of the risks of
abbreviated tenure, then corporations subject to or the likely target of
a corporate takeover may need to increase the equilibrium compensation
11 See Profusek, supra note 5, at 112-15 (sample golden parachute contracts); supra
note 4 (Acme Cleveland's, Allied's and Bendix's golden parachute agreements gear benefits
to executive's salary and benefits); supra note 3 (Bendix, Gulf Resources and Pennzoil of-
fered golden parachute employment contracts to only select few of key senior executives).
But see id. (Beneficial offered golden parachute employment contracts to 250 executives).
1 3 See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text (properly designed golden parachute
employment contracts represent most efficient response to increased risks corporate
takeovers pose to corporate executives).
... See D. VAGTS, supra note 49, at 332. Designing the most efficient executive compensa-
tion "package" is a matter of considerable concern to corporations. Id. An efficient executive
compensation plan would, in part, attract and hold desired executives as against competitive
offers at the minimum cost to the corporation. Id. See Generally G. WASHINGTON & V.
ROTHCHILD, supra note 8.
I See Herzel & Colling, supra note 11, at 10, col. 3 (golden parachutes represent market
response to growing risk of displacement by corporate takeovers faced by competent senior
executives of publicly held companies). Employment markets for senior corporate executives
traditionally have included some adjustment for the risks associated with an executive posi-
tion in a particular corporation. Id For example, executive positions in the television and
motion picture industries have commanded higher salaries than executive positions in
manufacturing industries since the risks of abbreviated tenure associated with an executive
position in the former industry exceed those of the latter. Id. at 12, col. 3; see also Analysis,
supra note 9, at 22, col. 4 (golden parachutes represent market response to increased risk
of displacement by corporate takeovers faced by senior executives).
"I, See Herzel & Coiling, supra note 11, at 10, col. 3 (motion picture and television ex-
ecutives traditionally have received salaries in excess of salaries received by executives
in manufacturing industry since risks of abbreviated tenure in motion picture and televi-
sion industry exceed risks of abbreviated tenure in manufacturing industry); Analysis, supra
note 9, at 22, col. 4 (same).
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rate of senior executives to retain or acquire executives' services. '3
Despite potential for abuse,"9 golden parachute contracts carefully
drafted to advance the corporate objective of maintaining a senior manage-
ment team represent the most efficient means of compensating senior
executives for the increased risks attendant to corporate takeovers.141 Con-
ditional golden parachutes designed to guarantee an executive's position
and salary following a change of control in the executive's corporation
allow corporations to compensate senior executives for the increased risks
associated with takeovers without upsetting the compensation differen-
tials existing between various levels of executives within a given corpora-
tion. Compensation differentials are an important consideration in any cor-
porate compensation plan. 4' Compensation committees composed of outside
directors carefully deliberate long and hard in arriving at equitable com-
pensation levels for corporate executives ranging from lower management
to senior executive officers." To the extent that golden parachutes allow
corporations to accommodate the increased risk a corporate takeover poses
" See Herzel & Coiling, supra note 11, at 10, col. 3 (risks of abbreviated tenure and
executive compensation); Analysis, spra note 9, at 22, col. 4 (same); see also supra notes
59-69 and accompanying text (target corporations may need to offer executives some added
security to prevent senior executives from leaving target corporation for other employ-
ment during unfriendly takeover).
11 See supra notes 100-33 and accompanying text (improperly drafted golden parachutes
may facilitate corporate waste). Golden parachute agreements that provide executives with
unconditional cash bonus payments following corporate takeovers may facilitate corporate
waste. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text. In addition, golden parachute
agreements that provide executives with severance packages more generous than executives
could have expected to receive in normal salary and benefits absent a change of control
or that cover more than the corporation's most valued executives may also facilitate cor-
porate waste. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
1I See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (since properly designed golden
parachutes do not upset corporations' existing compensation infrastructure and do not impose
unjustified costs on target corporations, properly designed golden parachutes represent
most efficient response to increased risks that corporate takeovers pose to target corpora-
tion executives). Corporations possess three alternative responses to the increased risks
corporate takeovers pose to senior level executives. First, a corporation may decide to ignore
the increased risks posed senior executives by corporate takeovers and run the risk of
losing key executives. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (anticipating dismissal,
target corporation executives, upon announcement of unfriendly takeover, may commence
search for new employment). Another alternative corporations may adopt in response to
the increased risks corporate takeovers pose to senior executives would be to give senior
executives a straight increase in their salaries upon the announcement of an unfriendly
takeover in an effort to induce senior executives to remain with the target corporations.
Finally, a corporation may adopt golden parachute employment contracts to insure senior
executives against the risks of abbreviated tenure associated with corporate takeovers.
See supra note 4 (golden parachute employment contracts insure executives against risks
incident to corporate takeovers).
141 Interview with Robert E.R. Huntley, Director of Phillip Morris Corporation and




to senior level executives without doing violence to the existing compen-
sation infrastructure of a given corporation, golden parachute employment
contracts represent an efficient response to the increased risks corporate
takeovers present to senior executives."' In addition, no costs accrue to
the corporation under a carefully drafted golden parachute contract unless
the corporation actually undergoes a change of control and the acquiring
corporation dismisses or reduces the responsibilities or position of the
target corporation executive.1" A straight salary increase for senior
executives, 14 5 on the other hand, would compensate executives for the in-
creased risks but also would impose immediate costs on the corporation
regardless of whether the corporation actually undergoes a change of con-
trol with the senior executive suffering adverse consequences. Carefully
drafted golden parachute employment contracts, therefore, represent the
most efficient response to the increased risks corporate takeovers pose
to senior corporate executives.
1 4
1
Corporations, in addition to carefully drafting golden parachute
agreements, should exercise care to ensure that directors authorize the
agreements properly. Only disinterested directors should take part in the
review and authorization of golden parachute contracts.47 Courts are reluc-
tant to interfere with the business affairs of corporations and normally
will defer to the sound business judgment of directors on matters of ex-
ecutive compensation. 48 When an interested director takes part in the
authorization of a corporate expenditure, however, courts will not defer
to the business judgment of the directors but rather will require the direc-
tors to establish the business justifications supporting the expenditure. 149
4 See supra note 140 (corporations possess three alternative responses to increased
risks corporate takeovers pose to target corporation executives).
14 See supra note 125 (carefully drafted golden parachutes employment contracts should
provide benefits only to executives that suffer adverse consequences following change of
control).
"I See supra note 140 (corporations possess three alternative responses to increased
risks corporate takeovers pose to target corporation executives).
I" See generally Herzel & Colling, supra note 11, at 10, col. 3; Analysis, supra note
9, at 22, col. 4.
14 See Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col. 4 (only disinterested directors should review
and authorize golden parachute employment contracts); see also Klein, supra note 2, at 56,
col. 3 (Gulf Resources refuses to honor company's golden parachute agreements since board
that originally authorized agreements did not have necessary degree of disinterestedness).
14 See supra note 107 (absent showing of fraud or bad faith, courts defer to sound business
judgment of corporate directors).
149 See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979). Ordinarily, corporate ex-
penditures made pursuant to executive compensation plans do not constitute a waste of
corporate assets as long as corporations receive fair consideration in return.-Id.; see supra
note 15 (adequate consideration must support executive compensation payments.) Courts
normally defer to the sound business judgment of directors on matters concerning the ade-
quacy of consideration that corporations receive for executive compensation expenditures.
Id.; see supra note 107 (business judgment rule). When interested directors authorize cor-
porate expenditures, however, courts will require directors to establish the entire fairness
of the corporate expenditures. Id
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Therefore, to ensure that courts will defer to a board's conclusions on
the propriety of golden parachute employment contracts, only disinterested
directors should authorize the agreements.15 °
Finally, corporations must disclose golden parachute plans to stock-
holders if the agreements are to survive judicial scrutiny.151 Federal
securities law requires the disclosure of material information to security
market participants.52 Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require
disclosure of the compensation paid to the five most highly compensated
executive officers whose cash and cash equivalent forms of-remuneration
exceed $50,000.11 In addition, SEC rules require the disclosure of any
remunerative plans or arrangements in excess of $50,000 that result or
will result from the termination of employment." Federal law, therefore,
mandates the disclosure of golden parachute employment contracts in a
corporation's annual proxy statement provided the potential costs of a
particular plan meet or exceed $50,000.'
Since golden parachute employment contracts may facilitate bona
fide corporate objectives, 5 ' corporate counsel can expect the growth in
the popularity of these special employment contracts to continue.'
"' See Masters, supra note 4, at 10, col. 4 (if interested directors authorze golden
parachute employment contracts then reviewing court may require directors to establish
intrinsic fairness of golden parachute plan).
151 See Profusek, supra note 5, at 110-11 (SEC disclosure requirements of golden parachute
employment contracts).
"5 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977) (federal law requires
disclosure of material information while state law codifies director's fiduciary duties).
11 See 17 C.F.R. S 229.402 (1982) (management remuneration and transactions). Item
402 of SEC REGULATION S-K requires a corporation to disclose in the proxy statement to
shareholders all remuneration paid to the five most highly compensated executive officers,
whose cash and cash equivalent forms of remuneration exceed $50,000. Id.
154 Id.
"I Id. Item 402 of SEC REGULATION S-K requires corporations to disclose executive
employment contracts between corporations and the five most highly compensated executives,
if their remuneration exceeds $50,000 in the corporation's proxy statement, Form 10-K
reports, or in the corporation's registration statements. Id.; see also supra note 77 (golden
parachute employment contracts may constitute antitakeover provisions and hence require
explicit disclosure as such in corporation's proxy statement).
1" See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (golden parachutes carefully designed
to acquire prospective or retain existing senior executives manifest a bona fide corporate
objective). But see supra note 108 (golden parachutes designed to deter hostile corporate
takeovers may not advance legitimate corporate objective since golden parachutes actually
may not operate as deterent to hostile corporate takeovers); id. (golden parachutes designed
to increase management objectivity during takeovers do not manifest bona fide corporate
objective since executives' fiduciary duty already necessitates executives' objectivity dur-
ing hostile takeovers).
See supra notes 3 & 10 (statistics on increasing prevalence of golden parachute pro-
visions in executive employment contracts). As long as the United States securities markets
continue to undervalue the price of corporate securities, the highly valued senior executives
of major corporations will continue to labor under the threat of a corporate takeover, and
the popularity of golden parachute employment contracts will contiue to increase. Profusek,
supra note 5, at 99-100; Ward Howell International, Inc., supra note 1, at 9.
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However, like all executive compensation arrangements, golden parachute
agreements are subject to abuse."5 Therefore, only the carefully drafted, s9
properly authorized," and adequately disclosed 6' golden parachute
agreements will survive judicial scrutiny.162
WILLIAM R. SPALDING
See supra note 139 (golden parachute employment contracts are subject to abuse).
153 See supra notes 109-33 and accompanying text (carefully drafted golden parachute
employment agreement provides corporation's most valued executives with conditional
benefits that do not exceed executive's normal salary and benefits).
11 See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text (disinterested directors must authorize
golden parachute employment contracts).
"I See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text (federal law mandates disclosure of
golden parachute employment contracts).
' See Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv.L. REv. 1, 9 (1934). The late Justice
Stone, referring to abuses in the area of executive compensation arrangements, once stated:
[Tihere is little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that it must bear some
burden of responsibility for these evils. But when we know and face the facts
we shall have to acknowledge that such departures from the fiduciary principle
do not usually occur without the active assistance of some member of our profes-
sion, and that their increasing recurrence would have been impossible but for
the complaisance of a Bar, too absorbed in the workaday care of private interests
to take account of these events of profound import or to sound the warning that
the profession looks askance upon these, as things that "are not done".
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